Finnish report on nuclear safety : Finnish 8th national report as referred to in Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety
Säteilyturvakeskus
31.07.2019
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-442-0
STUK-B : 237
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-442-0
STUK-B : 237
Tiivistelmä
Executive summary
Finland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 20 September 1994 and it was adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish National Report for the Eighth Review Meeting in March/April 2020.
There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors of VVER type), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). In addition, a new nuclear power plant unit (PWR) at the Olkiluoto site was granted operating license in March 2019 and is expected to start operation later in 2019. At both sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as final disposal facilities for low and intermediate level nuclear wastes. Posiva, a joint company of Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction licence application for the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facility in the end of 2012. The Government granted the construction licence to Posiva in November 2015.
Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 (VVER type design) in Pyhäjoki. Since the review is underway, Hanhikivi unit 1 is discussed in this report mainly with regard to the licensing process,organisatorial matters and siting (see Articles 7, 10, 11 and 17 and Annex 5).
Furthermore, there is a Triga Mark II research reactor, FiR 1 in Espoo operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). The reactor was permanently shut down in the end of June 2015. VTT applied for a license for the decommissioning in June 2017. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gave its statement on VTT’s application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in April 2019. After this the first license application for decommissioning phase in Finland will proceed to the Government for the decision making process.
In this report, the latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement are also covered.
Major developments in Finland since the Seventh Review Meeting are as follows: updating of legislative and regulatory framework, granting operating license for Olkiluoto 3, renewing the operating license of Olkiluoto 1&2 nuclear power units in 2018 including Periodic Safety Review (PSR). Furthermore, STUK completed its safety assessment of the operating license for decommissioining for the FiR 1 research reactor. Latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described in the relevant articles.
Most of the Fukushima Dai-ichi-related safety improvements presented in the Finnish national action plan have already been implemented. A few ongoing measures will be completed in 2019. Further information related to the actions taken in Finland following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant are described in more detail under Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
Finland continues to host and to participate in the international peer reviews. The following missions have been performed or are planned for the period of 2017–2022:
• Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission. The mission was conducted from 27 February to 16 March 2017
• Loviisa NPP OSART mission. The mission took place in March 2018.
• Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olkiluoto 3. The mission took place in March 2018.
• WANO follow-up review at Loviisa NPP in 2017.
• WANO peer review at Olkiluoto NPP in October 2016 with follow-up in 2018
• IPPAS mission will be performed in 2020.
• ARTEMIS mission has been requested for 2022.
• IRRS mission will be requested for 2022.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
• During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed, to take into account updates in international requirements, e.g. the Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the amendment (2014/52/EU) of Directive 2011/92/EU, and the radiation safety directive (2013/59/Euratom). No deviation from the Convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation safety regulations.
• Due to the aforementioned updates of the legislation, and due the fact that since the renewal of YVL Guides in 2013 nearly all IAEA Safety Requirements have been revised, and updated WENRA reference levels have been published, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. Until now (June 2019) 22 updated YVL Guides out of 47 are already published. Rest of the updated guides will be published later in 2019. The revised guides are applied as such for new nuclear facilities. Separate facility specific implementation decisions are made for the existing facilities and facilities under construction. Regular update and implementation of regulatory guides, particularly with regard to nuclear power plants in operation, are unique measures in the international perspective.
• The licensees have shown good safety performance in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only minor operational events (INES 1 and below) were reported and no major safety problems have occurred. After reorganising its activities in 2015, TVO experienced a decline in personnel job satisfaction that resulted in increased personnel turnover which challenged TVO’s management to retain organisational conditions for a good safety performance. Since then TVO has carried out various development actions to correct the situation and STUK has been able to verify proof of the positive effects of the measures taken by TVO. The licensees’ practices are considered to comply with the Convention obligations.
• Safety assessment is a continuous process and living full scope levels 1 and 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2015–2016, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 2016–2018 in the connection of the operating license renewal. Several plant modifications have been carried out at the operating NPPs during the recent years to further improve the safety. Some of these modifications are originating from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident lessons learned.
• The resources of STUK have been increased to meet the needs to oversee the construction of the new nuclear facilities in Finland. VTT supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety assessment work by performing safety analyses and providing safety analysis capabilities and tools. The national research programmes SAFIR and KYT develop and maintain the competencies in nuclear safety and waste management to enable STUK to take measures in unexpected events at Finnish plants or elsewhere, and to support decision making for the benefits of society and the environment.
• STUK published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. The strategy is comprised of nine targets categorizied in three groups and supported by four core values as presented in Figure 1. The implementation of the strategy is underway.
FIGURE 1. STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022.
Challenges identified by the Seventh Review Meeting
The Seventh Review Meeting in 2017 identified some challenges and suggestions to improve nuclear safety in Finland. These issues are included and addressed in this report. The issues were as follows:
• To manage simultaneously the oversight of many on-going activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities. This is a situation that STUK has never dealt with before.
- Provisions for plant ageing; I&C and other system modernisations carried out at the existing NPPs (incl. safety improvements); ageing management programmes are in place and re-reviewed in PSRs;
- Commissioning of Olkiluoto unit 3, review of the operating licence application, commissioning tests, and start of operation;
- Regulatory review of construction license application of Hanhikivi unit 1;
- Decommissioning of the FiR 1 research reactor.
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To finalise STUK strategic communication plan for raising public awareness and knowledge in risks related to radiation and nuclear utilization.
Concerning the first challenge, the mentioned oversight activities are discussed specially in the context of Articles 14 and 19 and in Appendices 4 and 5. The review of the Olkiluoto 3 operating license application, as well as the review of the FiR decommissioning license application have been completed. On the other hand, the review of the CL application of Hanhikivi-1 has been delayed because some of the required application material has not been yet submitted to STUK. Concerning ageing management, STUK completed the assessment of the periodic safety review of Loviisa NPP in 2017, and of Olkiluoto 1&2 in 2018. The ageing management programmes were evaluated as a part of the assessment. The large I&C modernisation project (ELSA) at the Loviisa NPP was completed in the original timetable in 2018. STUK also participated in the Topical Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, completed in 2017. As the main the oversight tasks are known well in advance, STUK is able to consider them in resource planning and knowledge management and in the use of technical support organisations. STUK’s resources and the amount of oversight are discussed in more detail in Article 8.
Interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, due to on-going new-build projects and public debate about future prospects of so-called SMRs (Small Modular Reactors). With this in mind, communication and information sharing with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety has become an increasingly important success factor for STUK, relevant ministries and utilities. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable by the general public. Risks related to radiation should be communicated realistically. Due to this challenge, STUK has carried out a number of development measures to improve its strategic communications and the use of modern communication tools. In particular, STUK has focused on the communication capacity of its personnel. STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to communicate with public and the media concerning their own area of expertise. For example, STUK’s personnel is encouraged to represent STUK in the social media. STUK has also developed key messages to communicate radiation and nuclear risks, and continued to develop its crisis communication capabilities. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour.
In addition, in the Seventh Review Meeting, some common major issues were identified based on the Country Group discussions. It was recommended that these issues are taken into account when preparing the national reports. Out of these issues, ageing management and safety culture were chosen to be discussed in the Eighth Review Meeting.
The nine common major issues are listed below with reference to the Articles (in brackets) in which the issues are addressed. Summaries related to ageing management and safety culture are given below, more detailed discussion can be found in Articles 14 (ageing management) and 10 (safety culture).
• Safety culture (Article 10)
• International peer reviews (Annex 6)
• Legal framework and independence of regulatory body (Article 7, Article 8)
• Financial and human resources (Article 8, Article 11)
• Knowledge management (Article 8, Article 11)
• Supply chain (Article 13, Article 14)
• Managing of safety of ageing nuclear facilities and plant life extensions (Article 14)
• Emergency preparedness (Article 16)
• Stakeholder consultation & communication (Article 7, Article 8, Annex 6).
Ageing management
STUK published in 2013 a YVL guide dedicated to ageing management. Up to 2013, the requirements for ageing management were covered by several different guides. In the guide published in 2013, some new requirements were introduced, mainly concerning the scope and content of the ageing management program, annual reporting and management of spare parts for long-lasting accidents. The guide has been updated since then, the latest version was published in February 2019. The implementation of the updated ageing management requirements is underway. The utilities have encountered some challenges in complying with the new requirements. For example, inspections performed after publishing the new guide in 2013 revealed that the amount of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the plant in a safe state also during prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the spare parts in the storage have either aged or became obsolete. Another challenge had to do with knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. An additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify new ageing mechanisms to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies to detect degradation early enough. During recent years significant progress has taken place in the spare part management. Organisational arrangements have been made and a dedicated database (Proactive Obsolescence Management System) has been introduced in both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. Dedicated groups consisting of necessary disciplines such as maintenance, quality control and procurement have taken charge of spare parts in terms of necessary availability and conditions.
A generic lesson learned is that the closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs. Instead of renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification is planned resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. Finland has successfully applied periodic safety reviews (PSR) for the operating NPPs. The practice has been that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that the safety of the operations can be ensured and improved also during the next 10 years. In order to do that the licensee has to commit to making safety improvements including necessary major modernisations to address the ageing of structures, systems and components (SSC).
An expert group dedicated to ageing management has been established in STUK to oversee how the licensees perform their duties in the ageing management of SSCs. The group, consisting of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil structure, and human resource experts as well as resident inspectors, plans and coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equipment and structures. If any shortcomings are found, for example in the condition monitoring or maintenance, the group contacts the licensee for clarifications or corrective actions. The group also follows up findings from other countries and evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing management of the Finnish nuclear power plants.
Finland participated in the Topical Peer Review (TPR) “Ageing Management” under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, carried out in 2017–18. The overall conclusion was that the ageing management has been satisfactory. However, some challenges and areas for improvement, as well as good practices, were identified and Finland is establishing a national action plan to address the findings. The results of the TPR are discussed under Article 14.
Safety Culture
The STUK Regulation sets a binding requirement for the licensees to maintain a good safety culture where safety is the priority. STUK revised the Guide YVL A.3 setting requirements for leadership and management for safety based on the IAEA GSR Part 2.
STUK carries out safety culture oversight by collecting and analysing observations from resident inspectors, documents, events and from other interactions with the licensee. STUK has implemented a tool for recording the observations. STUK also conducts specific inspections focusing on Leadership and Safety culture. STUK also follows the licensees’ safety culture self-assessments (e.g. results, possible changes in the methodology, actions decided based on the results). Furthermore, STUK has utilised VTT to carry out independent safety culture assessments in the licensee organisations. Independent safety culture assessments were done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 (2016) and Olkiluoto 3 (2017) to support STUK in the Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and Operating Licence process of Olkiluoto 3. VTT also carried out an independent safety culture assessment for Fennovoima and its plant supplier and main contractor organisation in 2017.
The utilities employ several different means for maintaining good safety culture. Priority of safety is emphasised in the safety or company policies. In addition to high level policy, the licensees have safety culture programmes, road maps or development plans for implementing the measures for maintaining good safety culture. The licensees monitor the safety culture by regular surveys and in-depth assessments. They also have in their organisations groups or functions independent of the line organisation to oversee and discuss safety and safety culture matters. Corrective action groups or functions exist. Training – including safety culture topics – is given to all newcomers and usually also to contractors. The safety significant contractors are required to familiarise their workforce with safety culture principles which is one of the topics of licensees’s audits on contractors and suppliers.
However, some challenges have appeard during the recent years.TVO reorganised its activities in 2015 resulting also in personnel reductions. These changes led to a decline in personnel job satisfaction and working climate. To ensure that these conditions would not affect the safety culture and safe operation, TVO has during the period 2016–2018 carried out various development actions to correct the situation. The effective corrective actions and monitoring their effectiveness were required by STUK. In 2018 and 2019, an improvement in the job satisfaction can be seen in TVO’s personnel surveys. Concerning Fennovoima, an independent safety culture assessment in 2017 revealed some deficiencies. The assessment covered also the plant supplier and the main contractor. The conclusion was that the safety culture at Fennovoima was at an acceptable level. However, several areas required improvements. These included e.g. the responsibilities for handling safety related issues, nuclear specific competencies, control of the supply chain and climate for raising concerns.The safety culture assessment also concluded that the safety culture at the plant supplier and at the main contractor need significant further development.
At STUK, safety is emphasised in the Management System. In 2013, all the departments made a self-assessment of their safety culture. The results were used in updating STUK’s safety and quality policy. In 2016 a safety culture survey was performed. In 2018 a comprehensive assessment of STUK’s safety culture was performed by external experts. The safety culture at STUK was considered to be at a good level and especially safety was considered to be a true value in STUK’s organization. Experts also identified several areas for improvement (e.g. learning from events and near misses, risk management, monitoring of safety culture), and these are addressed in a safety culture program which is under preparation. As a part of the preparation, a safety culture event was organised for STUK in April 2019 to discuss safety culture and particularly the risk management and learning from events and experience.
To better understand the ingrained conventions in the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK has continued to explore the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community within the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018. Furthermore, in March 2019 STUK hosted the OECD NEA and WANO managed Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK discussed the country-specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. Report is being prepared by the NEA.
Challenges and good practices identified by Finland
Finland has identified the following challenges:
• Implementation of STUK’s strategic objective related to the implementation of more risk-informed and performance-based regulation and oversight, and highlighting licensee’s responsibility for safety, including
• Changes needed to the nuclear energy regulations and regulatory guides, e.g. to be more be goal setting and enabling (also for emerging technologies, e.g. SMRs) and emphasising the licensees’ responsibility for safety.
• Developing the oversight activities to be more risk-informed and performance-based and emphasing licensees’ responsibility, e.g. by crediting licensees’ own oversight activities.
• Development of oversight practices and tools to take into account the possibilities offered by digitalisation, and ensuring that the personnel has the necessary related skills.
• Ensuring resources on the implementation of the strategic objectives as well as on the oversight of many ongoing activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities.
• Addressing the potential challenge related to the too stringent regulatory requirements preventing licensees to find suppliers to provide systems, structures and components needed for plant modifications and maintenance. Finnish licensees have established a project (KELPO) in which this challenge is partly being resolved by piloting the use of industrial standard components in safety class 3 applications.
• Long-term operation of the NPPs, including retention and renewal of the necessary competence.
• Ageing management should be proactive and consider also technological obsolescence. Early preparations (design, contracts, qualification, licensing) are advisable. The closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs.
• Knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs must be maintained.
• Additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify possible new ageing mechanisms and to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies for early enough detection of degradation.
• While new advanced inspection methods may reveal new defects, identification of the associated root or progress of the defecs over time is challenging
• Start of operation of Olkiluoto 3. A transition from a construction phase to operating phase can be a challenge both for the licensee and the regulatory body. The licensee should be ready to take the ownership of the plant, and the regulatory body should shift the focus of the oversight to ensuring safe operation which is different from overseeing a construction project.
A good practice is a practice, policy of program that makes a significant contribution to nuclear safety. It should be tired and proven in the country in question; not widely implemented in other countries but applicable to them. Good performance is otherwise similar, but may not be completely proven yet. Finland considers the following to be a good practice or a good performance:
• Improving culture for safety: Finnish nuclear community, including the regulator, has taken various actions to understand and improve culture for safety in their organisations. These include research activities in the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018 (e.g. the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community), licensees and licence applicant’s safety culture programmes complemented by independent safety culture studies conducted by VTT, STUK’s studies on its own safety culture programme and development of a safety culture programme for further improvement, and organisation of a Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK discussed the country specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. (good practice)
• Requirement management at STUK: STUK has developed a systematic approach for regulatory requirement management. The requirement management database contains the requirements presented in the regulations and guides. In the tool, each requirement has attributes (links to higher level legislation, links to licensing phase like construction or operation in which the requirement is relevant etc). Furthermore, the information about the fulfilment of the requirements at the facilities and the possible approved exemptions are recorded in the tool. This enables STUK to have all the time an overall picture of the compliance with the requirements at the NPPs. In updating the regulations and guides, the justification for modifications as well as comments received from the stakeholders are recorded in the tool. Between updates, recognised needs for modifications are also entered into the tool. (good practice)
• Interpretation and implementation of the Vienna Declaration in the Finnish Regulations: The Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and water. This safety goal is similar to the first principle of the Vienna Declaration. In addition, the Decree states that in order to limit the long-term effects, the limit for atmospheric releases of Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely small. STUK has included in the regulatory guides more detailed and more concrete interpretations for those safety goals of the Vienna Declaration. Guide YVL C.3 explains what is meant by “large-scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be designed in a way that:
- the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5·10-7/year;
- the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency. (good practice)
• Radiation measurement team from volunteers: A large scale nuclear or radiological emergency like a severe accident at a nuclear power plant, an explosion of a nuclear weapon or an explosion of so called dirty bomb could threat the function of the society. STUK, The National Defense Training Association of Finland and National Emergency Supply Agency launched in 2017 a project to establish a radiation measurement team from volunteers. The persons are trained and equipped by the three above mentioned organizations. The purpose of the team is to support authorities during a large scale nuclear or radiological emergency. In such situations, STUK’s duty is to give recommendations to the domestic authorities. The recommendations are based, among other things, on the performed radiation measurements. The first training course for the volunteers was arranged in spring 2018, followed by another course in autumn of the same year. The team is to consist of about 40 persons and it is assumed to start radiation measurements during the intermediate phase of radiation or nuclear emergency. (good practice)
• The national nuclear safety research programme SAFIR: SAFIR is a comprehensive nuclear safety research programme, where all relevant stakeholders are participating. It is a significant resource investment for a small country to ensure and develop national nuclear safety assessment capabilities and competencies. The results of the research projects in SAFIR are publicly available and can be used freely. All the results are reported in English, which enables using the results also outside Finland. (good performance)
• Collecting regulatory experience: STUK has further developed procedures and a dedicated database for collecting, recording and analysing findings of regulatory activities. The aim is to improve STUK’s regulatory processes and functions based on the regulatory experience and share our lessons learnt with interested parties. The procedure for managing STUK’s regulatory experience has been applied since the beginning of 2019. (good performance)
• Communication with the public and the media: STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to participate in communication with the public and the media concerning their areas of expertise. STUK, for example, encourages its personnel to represent themselves as experts and STUK in social media. STUK has focused on communication capacity of its personnel and has published guidelines for the principles and practices of communication. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour. (good performance)
Consideration of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the Contracting Parties by consensus at the Diplomatic Conference on 9 February 2015. The Vienna Declaration contains three principles to guide the Contracting Parties.
The first principle concerning the safety goal for new nuclear power plant design, siting, construction and operation is included in the Finnish regulations (see Articles 17 and 18). Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and water. In order to limit the long term effects, the limit for atmospheric releases of Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely small. Also, the possibility of a release in the early stages of the accident requiring measures to protect the public shall be extremely small. Finnish regulatory guide YVL C.3 explains in more detail what is meant by “large-scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be designed in compliance with the Government Decree principles in a way that:
• the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5·10-7/year;
• the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency.
Regarding the second principle, on the implementation of safety improvements at the operating NPPs to meet, as far as reasonably practicable, the safety goal of the first principle, Finnish Nuclear energy Act states that a periodic safety review (PSR) shall be conducted at least every ten years. In addition, it states that safety shall be maintained as high as practically possible and for further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that can be considered justified considering operating experience and safety research and advances in science and technology. Hence, the implementation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at both the Finnish NPPs since their commissioning. Especially the approach that STUK issues regulatory guides for new NPPs and regularly updates them, and then makes separate decision on the implementation and needed safety improvements at the operating nuclear facilities and facilities under construction, ensures reasonably practicable safety improvements at the Finnish nuclear facilities. Finnish regulations require also that licensees maintain an up-to-date and comprehensive plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and that they use the PRA to enhance nuclear facility safety, to identify and prioritise plant modification needs and to compare the safety significance of alternative solutions. The most significant plant modifications and modernisation projects carried out at the Finnish NPPs during the plant life time including backfitting of severe accident management systems during 1980’s and 1990’s are described in Annexes 2 and 3.
Regarding the third principle of the Vienna Declaration requiring that national regulations need to take into account the relevant IAEA safety standards and, as appropriate, other good practices, the Finnish nuclear safety regulations and guides are regularly updated taking into account operating and construction experience, safety research and advances in science and technology. The overall revision of the regulatory guides in end of 2013 took into account the international guidance (e.g. the IAEA safety standards and the WENRA safety reference levels) and the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. Due to updates in the IAEA Safety Requirements and in the WENRA Reference Levels since then, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. The updated guides will be published in 2019.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the objectives of the Convention, including the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety are complied with. Safety improvements have been implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since their commissioning. Legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed. Additional safety assessments and implementation plans for safety improvements have been made at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants based on the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The IRRS mission (the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Team) was carried out in October 2012 and the follow-up mission in 2015. No urgent need exists for additional improvements to upgrade the safety of the Finnish nuclear power plants in the context of the Convention.
Finland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 20 September 1994 and it was adopted on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratified on 5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish National Report for the Eighth Review Meeting in March/April 2020.
There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant comprises of two PWR units (pressurised water reactors of VVER type), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units (boiling water reactors), operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). In addition, a new nuclear power plant unit (PWR) at the Olkiluoto site was granted operating license in March 2019 and is expected to start operation later in 2019. At both sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as final disposal facilities for low and intermediate level nuclear wastes. Posiva, a joint company of Fortum and TVO, submitted a construction licence application for the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facility in the end of 2012. The Government granted the construction licence to Posiva in November 2015.
Finland is currently reviewing a construction licence application for Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 (VVER type design) in Pyhäjoki. Since the review is underway, Hanhikivi unit 1 is discussed in this report mainly with regard to the licensing process,organisatorial matters and siting (see Articles 7, 10, 11 and 17 and Annex 5).
Furthermore, there is a Triga Mark II research reactor, FiR 1 in Espoo operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). The reactor was permanently shut down in the end of June 2015. VTT applied for a license for the decommissioning in June 2017. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gave its statement on VTT’s application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in April 2019. After this the first license application for decommissioning phase in Finland will proceed to the Government for the decision making process.
In this report, the latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described. Major safety reviews and plant modernisations are explained including safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assessment, inspection and enforcement are also covered.
Major developments in Finland since the Seventh Review Meeting are as follows: updating of legislative and regulatory framework, granting operating license for Olkiluoto 3, renewing the operating license of Olkiluoto 1&2 nuclear power units in 2018 including Periodic Safety Review (PSR). Furthermore, STUK completed its safety assessment of the operating license for decommissioining for the FiR 1 research reactor. Latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described in the relevant articles.
Most of the Fukushima Dai-ichi-related safety improvements presented in the Finnish national action plan have already been implemented. A few ongoing measures will be completed in 2019. Further information related to the actions taken in Finland following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant are described in more detail under Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and Annexes 2, 3 and 4.
Finland continues to host and to participate in the international peer reviews. The following missions have been performed or are planned for the period of 2017–2022:
• Olkiluoto 1&2 OSART mission. The mission was conducted from 27 February to 16 March 2017
• Loviisa NPP OSART mission. The mission took place in March 2018.
• Pre-Operational OSART mission for Olkiluoto 3. The mission took place in March 2018.
• WANO follow-up review at Loviisa NPP in 2017.
• WANO peer review at Olkiluoto NPP in October 2016 with follow-up in 2018
• IPPAS mission will be performed in 2020.
• ARTEMIS mission has been requested for 2022.
• IRRS mission will be requested for 2022.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention is separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features emphasising Finnish safety management practices in the field of nuclear safety can be concluded:
• During the recent years Finnish legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed, to take into account updates in international requirements, e.g. the Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the amendment (2014/52/EU) of Directive 2011/92/EU, and the radiation safety directive (2013/59/Euratom). No deviation from the Convention obligations has been identified in the Finnish regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation safety regulations.
• Due to the aforementioned updates of the legislation, and due the fact that since the renewal of YVL Guides in 2013 nearly all IAEA Safety Requirements have been revised, and updated WENRA reference levels have been published, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. Until now (June 2019) 22 updated YVL Guides out of 47 are already published. Rest of the updated guides will be published later in 2019. The revised guides are applied as such for new nuclear facilities. Separate facility specific implementation decisions are made for the existing facilities and facilities under construction. Regular update and implementation of regulatory guides, particularly with regard to nuclear power plants in operation, are unique measures in the international perspective.
• The licensees have shown good safety performance in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and modernisation of existing NPPs. During recent years, only minor operational events (INES 1 and below) were reported and no major safety problems have occurred. After reorganising its activities in 2015, TVO experienced a decline in personnel job satisfaction that resulted in increased personnel turnover which challenged TVO’s management to retain organisational conditions for a good safety performance. Since then TVO has carried out various development actions to correct the situation and STUK has been able to verify proof of the positive effects of the measures taken by TVO. The licensees’ practices are considered to comply with the Convention obligations.
• Safety assessment is a continuous process and living full scope levels 1 and 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. Periodic safety review of the Loviisa plant was carried out in 2015–2016, and the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto plant was carried out in 2016–2018 in the connection of the operating license renewal. Several plant modifications have been carried out at the operating NPPs during the recent years to further improve the safety. Some of these modifications are originating from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident lessons learned.
• The resources of STUK have been increased to meet the needs to oversee the construction of the new nuclear facilities in Finland. VTT supports effectively the regulatory body in the safety assessment work by performing safety analyses and providing safety analysis capabilities and tools. The national research programmes SAFIR and KYT develop and maintain the competencies in nuclear safety and waste management to enable STUK to take measures in unexpected events at Finnish plants or elsewhere, and to support decision making for the benefits of society and the environment.
• STUK published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. The strategy is comprised of nine targets categorizied in three groups and supported by four core values as presented in Figure 1. The implementation of the strategy is underway.
FIGURE 1. STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022.
Challenges identified by the Seventh Review Meeting
The Seventh Review Meeting in 2017 identified some challenges and suggestions to improve nuclear safety in Finland. These issues are included and addressed in this report. The issues were as follows:
• To manage simultaneously the oversight of many on-going activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities. This is a situation that STUK has never dealt with before.
- Provisions for plant ageing; I&C and other system modernisations carried out at the existing NPPs (incl. safety improvements); ageing management programmes are in place and re-reviewed in PSRs;
- Commissioning of Olkiluoto unit 3, review of the operating licence application, commissioning tests, and start of operation;
- Regulatory review of construction license application of Hanhikivi unit 1;
- Decommissioning of the FiR 1 research reactor.
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To finalise STUK strategic communication plan for raising public awareness and knowledge in risks related to radiation and nuclear utilization.
Concerning the first challenge, the mentioned oversight activities are discussed specially in the context of Articles 14 and 19 and in Appendices 4 and 5. The review of the Olkiluoto 3 operating license application, as well as the review of the FiR decommissioning license application have been completed. On the other hand, the review of the CL application of Hanhikivi-1 has been delayed because some of the required application material has not been yet submitted to STUK. Concerning ageing management, STUK completed the assessment of the periodic safety review of Loviisa NPP in 2017, and of Olkiluoto 1&2 in 2018. The ageing management programmes were evaluated as a part of the assessment. The large I&C modernisation project (ELSA) at the Loviisa NPP was completed in the original timetable in 2018. STUK also participated in the Topical Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, completed in 2017. As the main the oversight tasks are known well in advance, STUK is able to consider them in resource planning and knowledge management and in the use of technical support organisations. STUK’s resources and the amount of oversight are discussed in more detail in Article 8.
Interest in nuclear power in Finland is increasing, due to on-going new-build projects and public debate about future prospects of so-called SMRs (Small Modular Reactors). With this in mind, communication and information sharing with media and the general public on nuclear and radiation safety has become an increasingly important success factor for STUK, relevant ministries and utilities. Regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable by the general public. Risks related to radiation should be communicated realistically. Due to this challenge, STUK has carried out a number of development measures to improve its strategic communications and the use of modern communication tools. In particular, STUK has focused on the communication capacity of its personnel. STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to communicate with public and the media concerning their own area of expertise. For example, STUK’s personnel is encouraged to represent STUK in the social media. STUK has also developed key messages to communicate radiation and nuclear risks, and continued to develop its crisis communication capabilities. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour.
In addition, in the Seventh Review Meeting, some common major issues were identified based on the Country Group discussions. It was recommended that these issues are taken into account when preparing the national reports. Out of these issues, ageing management and safety culture were chosen to be discussed in the Eighth Review Meeting.
The nine common major issues are listed below with reference to the Articles (in brackets) in which the issues are addressed. Summaries related to ageing management and safety culture are given below, more detailed discussion can be found in Articles 14 (ageing management) and 10 (safety culture).
• Safety culture (Article 10)
• International peer reviews (Annex 6)
• Legal framework and independence of regulatory body (Article 7, Article 8)
• Financial and human resources (Article 8, Article 11)
• Knowledge management (Article 8, Article 11)
• Supply chain (Article 13, Article 14)
• Managing of safety of ageing nuclear facilities and plant life extensions (Article 14)
• Emergency preparedness (Article 16)
• Stakeholder consultation & communication (Article 7, Article 8, Annex 6).
Ageing management
STUK published in 2013 a YVL guide dedicated to ageing management. Up to 2013, the requirements for ageing management were covered by several different guides. In the guide published in 2013, some new requirements were introduced, mainly concerning the scope and content of the ageing management program, annual reporting and management of spare parts for long-lasting accidents. The guide has been updated since then, the latest version was published in February 2019. The implementation of the updated ageing management requirements is underway. The utilities have encountered some challenges in complying with the new requirements. For example, inspections performed after publishing the new guide in 2013 revealed that the amount of spare parts can be inadequate for keeping the plant in a safe state also during prolonged transients and accidents, and that some of the spare parts in the storage have either aged or became obsolete. Another challenge had to do with knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs. An additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify new ageing mechanisms to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies to detect degradation early enough. During recent years significant progress has taken place in the spare part management. Organisational arrangements have been made and a dedicated database (Proactive Obsolescence Management System) has been introduced in both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs. Dedicated groups consisting of necessary disciplines such as maintenance, quality control and procurement have taken charge of spare parts in terms of necessary availability and conditions.
A generic lesson learned is that the closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs. Instead of renewing a system or a component, modernisation may be rejected or a partial modification is planned resulting in ageing issues in the remaining parts. Finland has successfully applied periodic safety reviews (PSR) for the operating NPPs. The practice has been that the licensee is obliged to demonstrate that the safety of the operations can be ensured and improved also during the next 10 years. In order to do that the licensee has to commit to making safety improvements including necessary major modernisations to address the ageing of structures, systems and components (SSC).
An expert group dedicated to ageing management has been established in STUK to oversee how the licensees perform their duties in the ageing management of SSCs. The group, consisting of mechanical, electrical, I&C, civil structure, and human resource experts as well as resident inspectors, plans and coordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to the ageing of nuclear facility systems, equipment and structures. If any shortcomings are found, for example in the condition monitoring or maintenance, the group contacts the licensee for clarifications or corrective actions. The group also follows up findings from other countries and evaluates their possible applicability to the ageing management of the Finnish nuclear power plants.
Finland participated in the Topical Peer Review (TPR) “Ageing Management” under the Nuclear Safety Directive 2014/87/EURATOM, carried out in 2017–18. The overall conclusion was that the ageing management has been satisfactory. However, some challenges and areas for improvement, as well as good practices, were identified and Finland is establishing a national action plan to address the findings. The results of the TPR are discussed under Article 14.
Safety Culture
The STUK Regulation sets a binding requirement for the licensees to maintain a good safety culture where safety is the priority. STUK revised the Guide YVL A.3 setting requirements for leadership and management for safety based on the IAEA GSR Part 2.
STUK carries out safety culture oversight by collecting and analysing observations from resident inspectors, documents, events and from other interactions with the licensee. STUK has implemented a tool for recording the observations. STUK also conducts specific inspections focusing on Leadership and Safety culture. STUK also follows the licensees’ safety culture self-assessments (e.g. results, possible changes in the methodology, actions decided based on the results). Furthermore, STUK has utilised VTT to carry out independent safety culture assessments in the licensee organisations. Independent safety culture assessments were done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 (2016) and Olkiluoto 3 (2017) to support STUK in the Licence Renewal of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and Operating Licence process of Olkiluoto 3. VTT also carried out an independent safety culture assessment for Fennovoima and its plant supplier and main contractor organisation in 2017.
The utilities employ several different means for maintaining good safety culture. Priority of safety is emphasised in the safety or company policies. In addition to high level policy, the licensees have safety culture programmes, road maps or development plans for implementing the measures for maintaining good safety culture. The licensees monitor the safety culture by regular surveys and in-depth assessments. They also have in their organisations groups or functions independent of the line organisation to oversee and discuss safety and safety culture matters. Corrective action groups or functions exist. Training – including safety culture topics – is given to all newcomers and usually also to contractors. The safety significant contractors are required to familiarise their workforce with safety culture principles which is one of the topics of licensees’s audits on contractors and suppliers.
However, some challenges have appeard during the recent years.TVO reorganised its activities in 2015 resulting also in personnel reductions. These changes led to a decline in personnel job satisfaction and working climate. To ensure that these conditions would not affect the safety culture and safe operation, TVO has during the period 2016–2018 carried out various development actions to correct the situation. The effective corrective actions and monitoring their effectiveness were required by STUK. In 2018 and 2019, an improvement in the job satisfaction can be seen in TVO’s personnel surveys. Concerning Fennovoima, an independent safety culture assessment in 2017 revealed some deficiencies. The assessment covered also the plant supplier and the main contractor. The conclusion was that the safety culture at Fennovoima was at an acceptable level. However, several areas required improvements. These included e.g. the responsibilities for handling safety related issues, nuclear specific competencies, control of the supply chain and climate for raising concerns.The safety culture assessment also concluded that the safety culture at the plant supplier and at the main contractor need significant further development.
At STUK, safety is emphasised in the Management System. In 2013, all the departments made a self-assessment of their safety culture. The results were used in updating STUK’s safety and quality policy. In 2016 a safety culture survey was performed. In 2018 a comprehensive assessment of STUK’s safety culture was performed by external experts. The safety culture at STUK was considered to be at a good level and especially safety was considered to be a true value in STUK’s organization. Experts also identified several areas for improvement (e.g. learning from events and near misses, risk management, monitoring of safety culture), and these are addressed in a safety culture program which is under preparation. As a part of the preparation, a safety culture event was organised for STUK in April 2019 to discuss safety culture and particularly the risk management and learning from events and experience.
To better understand the ingrained conventions in the Finnish culture and their possible positive and/or negative impacts on safety culture, STUK has continued to explore the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community within the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018. Furthermore, in March 2019 STUK hosted the OECD NEA and WANO managed Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK discussed the country-specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. Report is being prepared by the NEA.
Challenges and good practices identified by Finland
Finland has identified the following challenges:
• Implementation of STUK’s strategic objective related to the implementation of more risk-informed and performance-based regulation and oversight, and highlighting licensee’s responsibility for safety, including
• Changes needed to the nuclear energy regulations and regulatory guides, e.g. to be more be goal setting and enabling (also for emerging technologies, e.g. SMRs) and emphasising the licensees’ responsibility for safety.
• Developing the oversight activities to be more risk-informed and performance-based and emphasing licensees’ responsibility, e.g. by crediting licensees’ own oversight activities.
• Development of oversight practices and tools to take into account the possibilities offered by digitalisation, and ensuring that the personnel has the necessary related skills.
• Ensuring resources on the implementation of the strategic objectives as well as on the oversight of many ongoing activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities.
• Addressing the potential challenge related to the too stringent regulatory requirements preventing licensees to find suppliers to provide systems, structures and components needed for plant modifications and maintenance. Finnish licensees have established a project (KELPO) in which this challenge is partly being resolved by piloting the use of industrial standard components in safety class 3 applications.
• Long-term operation of the NPPs, including retention and renewal of the necessary competence.
• Ageing management should be proactive and consider also technological obsolescence. Early preparations (design, contracts, qualification, licensing) are advisable. The closer the nuclear power plants come to the end of their licensed operation, especially due to the low market price of electricity, the more challenging it is for the licensees to initiate modernisations or other major activities to improve the safety of the NPPs.
• Knowledge and resources allocated for ensuring appropriate ageing management programme at NPPs must be maintained.
• Additional challenge is to conduct relevant research to both educate personnel and to identify possible new ageing mechanisms and to develop new inspection or monitoring technologies for early enough detection of degradation.
• While new advanced inspection methods may reveal new defects, identification of the associated root or progress of the defecs over time is challenging
• Start of operation of Olkiluoto 3. A transition from a construction phase to operating phase can be a challenge both for the licensee and the regulatory body. The licensee should be ready to take the ownership of the plant, and the regulatory body should shift the focus of the oversight to ensuring safe operation which is different from overseeing a construction project.
A good practice is a practice, policy of program that makes a significant contribution to nuclear safety. It should be tired and proven in the country in question; not widely implemented in other countries but applicable to them. Good performance is otherwise similar, but may not be completely proven yet. Finland considers the following to be a good practice or a good performance:
• Improving culture for safety: Finnish nuclear community, including the regulator, has taken various actions to understand and improve culture for safety in their organisations. These include research activities in the Finnish nuclear research program SAFIR 2018 (e.g. the sociological factors influencing safety culture in the Finnish nuclear community), licensees and licence applicant’s safety culture programmes complemented by independent safety culture studies conducted by VTT, STUK’s studies on its own safety culture programme and development of a safety culture programme for further improvement, and organisation of a Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum in Helsinki where personnel from the Finnish nuclear utilities and STUK discussed the country specific culture traits and their possible influences on the nuclear safety culture. (good practice)
• Requirement management at STUK: STUK has developed a systematic approach for regulatory requirement management. The requirement management database contains the requirements presented in the regulations and guides. In the tool, each requirement has attributes (links to higher level legislation, links to licensing phase like construction or operation in which the requirement is relevant etc). Furthermore, the information about the fulfilment of the requirements at the facilities and the possible approved exemptions are recorded in the tool. This enables STUK to have all the time an overall picture of the compliance with the requirements at the NPPs. In updating the regulations and guides, the justification for modifications as well as comments received from the stakeholders are recorded in the tool. Between updates, recognised needs for modifications are also entered into the tool. (good practice)
• Interpretation and implementation of the Vienna Declaration in the Finnish Regulations: The Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and water. This safety goal is similar to the first principle of the Vienna Declaration. In addition, the Decree states that in order to limit the long-term effects, the limit for atmospheric releases of Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely small. STUK has included in the regulatory guides more detailed and more concrete interpretations for those safety goals of the Vienna Declaration. Guide YVL C.3 explains what is meant by “large-scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be designed in a way that:
- the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5·10-7/year;
- the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency. (good practice)
• Radiation measurement team from volunteers: A large scale nuclear or radiological emergency like a severe accident at a nuclear power plant, an explosion of a nuclear weapon or an explosion of so called dirty bomb could threat the function of the society. STUK, The National Defense Training Association of Finland and National Emergency Supply Agency launched in 2017 a project to establish a radiation measurement team from volunteers. The persons are trained and equipped by the three above mentioned organizations. The purpose of the team is to support authorities during a large scale nuclear or radiological emergency. In such situations, STUK’s duty is to give recommendations to the domestic authorities. The recommendations are based, among other things, on the performed radiation measurements. The first training course for the volunteers was arranged in spring 2018, followed by another course in autumn of the same year. The team is to consist of about 40 persons and it is assumed to start radiation measurements during the intermediate phase of radiation or nuclear emergency. (good practice)
• The national nuclear safety research programme SAFIR: SAFIR is a comprehensive nuclear safety research programme, where all relevant stakeholders are participating. It is a significant resource investment for a small country to ensure and develop national nuclear safety assessment capabilities and competencies. The results of the research projects in SAFIR are publicly available and can be used freely. All the results are reported in English, which enables using the results also outside Finland. (good performance)
• Collecting regulatory experience: STUK has further developed procedures and a dedicated database for collecting, recording and analysing findings of regulatory activities. The aim is to improve STUK’s regulatory processes and functions based on the regulatory experience and share our lessons learnt with interested parties. The procedure for managing STUK’s regulatory experience has been applied since the beginning of 2019. (good performance)
• Communication with the public and the media: STUK applies the principle that all STUK’s employees have both the right and duty to participate in communication with the public and the media concerning their areas of expertise. STUK, for example, encourages its personnel to represent themselves as experts and STUK in social media. STUK has focused on communication capacity of its personnel and has published guidelines for the principles and practices of communication. Furthermore, STUK has defined strategic goals for communication, and measures – not only the outputs but particularly the outcomes – how communication changes opinions, attitudes and change of behaviour. (good performance)
Consideration of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the Contracting Parties by consensus at the Diplomatic Conference on 9 February 2015. The Vienna Declaration contains three principles to guide the Contracting Parties.
The first principle concerning the safety goal for new nuclear power plant design, siting, construction and operation is included in the Finnish regulations (see Articles 17 and 18). Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy Decree stipulates that the radioactive releases resulting from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant shall not necessitate large-scale protective measures for the population nor any long-term restrictions on the use of extensive areas of land and water. In order to limit the long term effects, the limit for atmospheric releases of Cs-137 is 100 TBq. The possibility of exceeding the set limit and of a release in the early stages of an accident requiring measures to protect the population shall be extremely small. Also, the possibility of a release in the early stages of the accident requiring measures to protect the public shall be extremely small. Finnish regulatory guide YVL C.3 explains in more detail what is meant by “large-scale protective measures”. Analyses must be provided to demonstrate that any release of radioactive substances in a severe accident shall not warrant the evacuation of the population beyond the protective zone (appr. 5 km) or the need for people beyond the emergency planning zone (appr. 20 km) to seek shelter indoors. Guide YVL A.7 states that a nuclear power plant unit shall be designed in compliance with the Government Decree principles in a way that:
• the mean value of the frequency of a release of radioactive substances from the plant during an accident involving a Cs-137 release into the atmosphere in excess of 100 TBq is less than 5·10-7/year;
• the accident sequences, in which the containment function fails or is lost in the early phase of a severe accident, have only a small contribution to the reactor core damage frequency.
Regarding the second principle, on the implementation of safety improvements at the operating NPPs to meet, as far as reasonably practicable, the safety goal of the first principle, Finnish Nuclear energy Act states that a periodic safety review (PSR) shall be conducted at least every ten years. In addition, it states that safety shall be maintained as high as practically possible and for further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that can be considered justified considering operating experience and safety research and advances in science and technology. Hence, the implementation of safety improvements has been a continuing process at both the Finnish NPPs since their commissioning. Especially the approach that STUK issues regulatory guides for new NPPs and regularly updates them, and then makes separate decision on the implementation and needed safety improvements at the operating nuclear facilities and facilities under construction, ensures reasonably practicable safety improvements at the Finnish nuclear facilities. Finnish regulations require also that licensees maintain an up-to-date and comprehensive plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and that they use the PRA to enhance nuclear facility safety, to identify and prioritise plant modification needs and to compare the safety significance of alternative solutions. The most significant plant modifications and modernisation projects carried out at the Finnish NPPs during the plant life time including backfitting of severe accident management systems during 1980’s and 1990’s are described in Annexes 2 and 3.
Regarding the third principle of the Vienna Declaration requiring that national regulations need to take into account the relevant IAEA safety standards and, as appropriate, other good practices, the Finnish nuclear safety regulations and guides are regularly updated taking into account operating and construction experience, safety research and advances in science and technology. The overall revision of the regulatory guides in end of 2013 took into account the international guidance (e.g. the IAEA safety standards and the WENRA safety reference levels) and the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. Due to updates in the IAEA Safety Requirements and in the WENRA Reference Levels since then, STUK started to update the YVL Guides anew in 2017. The updated guides will be published in 2019.
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the objectives of the Convention, including the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety are complied with. Safety improvements have been implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since their commissioning. Legislation and regulatory guidance have been further developed. Additional safety assessments and implementation plans for safety improvements have been made at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants based on the lessons learnt from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The IRRS mission (the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Team) was carried out in October 2012 and the follow-up mission in 2015. No urgent need exists for additional improvements to upgrade the safety of the Finnish nuclear power plants in the context of the Convention.
Kokoelmat
- STUKin omat sarjajulkaisut [2304]