National Safeguards Concept for Encapsulation Plant and Geological Repository
Honkamaa, Tapani; Hämäläinen, Marko; Martikka, Elina; Moring, Mikael; Okko, Olli; Tupasela, Topi (2019-12-12)
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Honkamaa, Tapani
Hämäläinen, Marko
Martikka, Elina
Moring, Mikael
Okko, Olli
Tupasela, Topi
ESARDA
12.12.2019
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Tiivistelmä
To make geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel project successful from safeguards point of view, we
need to answer two basic questions 1) Are the declarations of the fuel correct and complete? 2) Can
we and future generations be and stay assured at any point of time that all verified fuel is disposed
and securely kept in the repository as declared?
STUK has created a national safeguards concept for the Finnish encapsulation plant and geological
repository. The concept describes at a general level the principles and practices of the safeguards
measures from the intermediate storage to the closure of the geological repository.
Recommendations of the IAEA Group of Experts ASTOR (Application of Safeguards TO Repositories)
are followed in the national concept. All fuel items will be verified prior to encapsulation and disposal.
The verification technology proposed is a combined system of PGET and PNAR/FORK verification
tools. Shared access to the measurement data between all inspectorates shall be secured, since all of
them will draw their individual conclusions.
On order to draw conclusions about continuity-of-knowledge and detection of undeclared activities,
STUK will exploit on the conclusions of EC and the IAEA. In addition, STUK will make use of its own
continuous 3S inspection efforts, observations of other authorities in Finland and the results of the
ongoing environmental monitoring programme.
At the moment no one can provide fully satisfying answers to how post-closure safeguards activities
will be arranged. There are concerns that these activities may cause undesired burden on future
generations with never ending surveillance of the site. However, there is still time to resolve these
concerns. Present understanding is that safeguards may continue with the existing institutions and
arrangements as long as the safeguards agreements are in force.
need to answer two basic questions 1) Are the declarations of the fuel correct and complete? 2) Can
we and future generations be and stay assured at any point of time that all verified fuel is disposed
and securely kept in the repository as declared?
STUK has created a national safeguards concept for the Finnish encapsulation plant and geological
repository. The concept describes at a general level the principles and practices of the safeguards
measures from the intermediate storage to the closure of the geological repository.
Recommendations of the IAEA Group of Experts ASTOR (Application of Safeguards TO Repositories)
are followed in the national concept. All fuel items will be verified prior to encapsulation and disposal.
The verification technology proposed is a combined system of PGET and PNAR/FORK verification
tools. Shared access to the measurement data between all inspectorates shall be secured, since all of
them will draw their individual conclusions.
On order to draw conclusions about continuity-of-knowledge and detection of undeclared activities,
STUK will exploit on the conclusions of EC and the IAEA. In addition, STUK will make use of its own
continuous 3S inspection efforts, observations of other authorities in Finland and the results of the
ongoing environmental monitoring programme.
At the moment no one can provide fully satisfying answers to how post-closure safeguards activities
will be arranged. There are concerns that these activities may cause undesired burden on future
generations with never ending surveillance of the site. However, there is still time to resolve these
concerns. Present understanding is that safeguards may continue with the existing institutions and
arrangements as long as the safeguards agreements are in force.