Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Annual report 2014

Abstract

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).

The results of STUK'’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2014 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations.

Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” – and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the nonproliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At then end of 2013, the new STUK regulations – called YVL Guides – entered into force. All the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. The approval process will continue in 2015.

Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.

The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In December 2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by Rusatom Overseas. This was not included as an option in the application of 2009, and thus the re-evaluation of the conditions for the previous authorisation was carried out in 2014, resulting in new Decision-in-Principle endorsed by the Parliament in December 2014. In parallel with this, the TVO application to extend the time line for the fourth unit was denied by the Government. Owing to these decisions, the construction licence applications are expected in 2015.

Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given approval from the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties continued in 2014; and, finally in November 2014 the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for bankruptcy. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK.

STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.

The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2014. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, the number in inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey campaign carried out at Onkalo, the planned geological repository. In total, 65 working days were required for the one-week long scanning of the tunnels.

The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the government in December 2012. The licensing of the facility was one of the main topics over the year as a whole at STUK. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive process with STUK and Posiva. This document will be included in the STUK statement to be finalised in 2015.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.

A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.

The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2014 was focused on nuclear material control: in particular, information security issues were addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site.

In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts initiated practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.