Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2016

Abstract

Abstract

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).

Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under construction are being licensed, imported and installed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.

STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.

The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2016 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations.

The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2016. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2016, the number of inspection days was significantly higher at a total of 98, owing to the system inspections carried out during the year as a part of STUK’s periodic inspection programme. In contrast to this, there was no survey campaign to verify the design of the planned geological repository, resulting in only 12 IAEA inspection days in 2016, whereas, the Commission needed 18 inspection days to fulfil its duties in 2016.

A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task as demonstrated twice during 2016.

The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2016 was focused on nuclear material control: in particular, standard operational procedures were addressed within the nuclear regulator departments. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the new nuclear materials database was developed in this context. Due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular the passive gamma emission tomography for the verification of spent fuel.

In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. STUK and Finnish Customs finalised the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officer training and the updating of the technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.