Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2020

Abstract

Abstract The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nuclear safeguards, is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) play a central role in the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). STUK cooperates nationally with the ministries, customs, border control and other domestic stakeholders in the areas of non-proliferation, export control and nuclear disarmament. Core stakeholders in the SSAC are the operators and licence holders who have the ultimate responsibility for their nuclear materials and related activities. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. In addition, there is a shutdown research reactor in Espoo with fresh nuclear fuel still at the site. Other Finnish operators include STUK itself, the University of Helsinki and VTT’s Centre for Nuclear Safety as mid-sized holders, holders of nuclear materials generated as concentrates or by-products in the mineral processing industry and 13 minor nuclear material holders. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union safeguards regulations, and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards accounting and verification activities in 2020 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the operators' declarations. The operators’ own nuclear materials accountancy and control systems enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In 2020, STUK and other stakeholders faced unforeseen circumstances caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Travel and gathering restrictions particularly impacted international events, but also presented a challenge for STUK to continue safeguards inspection activities uninterrupted. STUK adapted to the circumstances by postponing non-urgent field activities, cooperating with the operators to ensure that health and safety precautions were taken, and performing remote inspections. STUK finished the year with 39 inspections and 89 inspection days, both of which are just below and above average. The number of international inspections and inspection days were also close to the average. According to the statements on inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided by the IAEA and the Commission in 2020, the IAEA issued a total of two notices for and required two actions from operators in Finland. The notices were responded to and the actions were completed satisfactorily by the end of 2020. The Nuclear Materials section saw two new employees joining in early 2020: one researcher to work on the passive gamma emission tomography methods and one safeguards inspector. Inspector responsibilities were rearranged from responsible officer and deputy to responsible officer pairs with the aim of strengthening teamwork and promoting job rotation. Special arrangements with inspections and working from home due to COVID-19 restrictions delayed training of new inspectors and resulted in the cancellation of events but also allowed old and new inspectors to focus on the development of their own expertise and internal procedures. As a continuation of technical development work, due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity measurement for the verification of spent fuel. A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to carry out a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in this common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.