Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2013
Okko, Olli (2014-06-09)
Okko, Olli
Säteilyturvakeskus
09.06.2014
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-146-7
STUK-B : 173
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-146-7
STUK-B : 173
Kuvaus
1. painos
Tiivistelmä
Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2013 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards accountancy system and procedures of one of the stakeholders in 2013, setting required actions to comply with procedures.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle -related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often referred to as "licence holders" or "operators" – and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy.
Finland has significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there are the VTT research reactor in Espoo and a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In December 2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by Rusatom Overseas. This was not included as option in the application of 2009, and thus the re-evaluation of the conditions for the old authorisation was initiated.
Uranium production at the Talvivaara mine got approval from government according to the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012 as uranium may be economically extracted as one of the by-products of nickel, because the bioheapleaching technique developed for large nickel deposits makes the extraction of other metals from low grade ore economically viable. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval owing to claims of environmental and economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery.
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2013. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2013 was focused on nuclear materials control, in particular at the back end of the fuel cycle. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. The application for the licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the government in December 2012. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in co-operation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training and the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures.
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2013 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards accountancy system and procedures of one of the stakeholders in 2013, setting required actions to comply with procedures.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle -related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often referred to as "licence holders" or "operators" – and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy.
Finland has significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there are the VTT research reactor in Espoo and a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In December 2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by Rusatom Overseas. This was not included as option in the application of 2009, and thus the re-evaluation of the conditions for the old authorisation was initiated.
Uranium production at the Talvivaara mine got approval from government according to the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012 as uranium may be economically extracted as one of the by-products of nickel, because the bioheapleaching technique developed for large nickel deposits makes the extraction of other metals from low grade ore economically viable. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval owing to claims of environmental and economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery.
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2013. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2013 was focused on nuclear materials control, in particular at the back end of the fuel cycle. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. The application for the licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the government in December 2012. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in co-operation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training and the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures.
Kokoelmat
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