Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2015
Okko, Olli (2016-03-21)
Säteilyturvakeskus
21.03.2016
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-306-5
STUK-B : 200
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-306-5
STUK-B : 200
Kuvaus
1. painos
Tiivistelmä
Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2015 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators”– and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At the end of 2013, the revised STUK requirements were published as regulatory guides on nuclear safety, security and safeguards, called YVL guides. According to the Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards all the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. During 2015, in total 19 draft manuals were submitted to STUK, and 14 of those were approved.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under construction are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the Olkiluoto 4 reactor and a new nuclear power plant site, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors shall be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. During 2015, the construction licence application for the new Hanhikivi plant was submitted to the Government. The authorisation of the Olkiluoto 4 unit expired as the operator did not apply for the construction licence within the 5 year period of validity of the authorisation, i.e. the Decision-in-Principle by the Government, so the material balance area code was also withdrawn. The research reactor was shut down in 2015 and the preparations for decommissioning continue in Espoo. On the other hand, in order to continue research activities, the new VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety was under construction at the research campus in Espoo.
Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given approval by the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012. In 2013, the mining company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and economic issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties continued in 2014, and finally in November 2014 Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for bankruptcy. During 2015 a new operator, Terrafame Mining Oy took over the mining and milling activities, but no uranium extraction nor safeguards activities took place at Talvivaara. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK and to the European Commission.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the Government in December 2012. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive process with STUK and Posiva. These needs were included in the STUK statement and safety evaluation concerning the construction licence application finalised in February 2015. In November 2015 the Government granted the construction licence. In the meanwhile, the detailed design of the facility was updated resulting in the continuation of the planning of the safeguards system.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2015. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, the number of inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey campaign to verify the design of the planned geological repository, called Onkalo. In 2015 a concise survey campaign was carried out at Onkalo resulting in an increased number of inspection days since 2013. The number of annual inspection days for nuclear material holders has remained at 20 days per international inspectorate.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2015 was focused on nuclear material control: in particular, information security issues were addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site.
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2015 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators”– and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At the end of 2013, the revised STUK requirements were published as regulatory guides on nuclear safety, security and safeguards, called YVL guides. According to the Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards all the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. During 2015, in total 19 draft manuals were submitted to STUK, and 14 of those were approved.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under construction are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the Olkiluoto 4 reactor and a new nuclear power plant site, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors shall be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. During 2015, the construction licence application for the new Hanhikivi plant was submitted to the Government. The authorisation of the Olkiluoto 4 unit expired as the operator did not apply for the construction licence within the 5 year period of validity of the authorisation, i.e. the Decision-in-Principle by the Government, so the material balance area code was also withdrawn. The research reactor was shut down in 2015 and the preparations for decommissioning continue in Espoo. On the other hand, in order to continue research activities, the new VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety was under construction at the research campus in Espoo.
Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given approval by the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012. In 2013, the mining company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and economic issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties continued in 2014, and finally in November 2014 Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for bankruptcy. During 2015 a new operator, Terrafame Mining Oy took over the mining and milling activities, but no uranium extraction nor safeguards activities took place at Talvivaara. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK and to the European Commission.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the Government in December 2012. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive process with STUK and Posiva. These needs were included in the STUK statement and safety evaluation concerning the construction licence application finalised in February 2015. In November 2015 the Government granted the construction licence. In the meanwhile, the detailed design of the facility was updated resulting in the continuation of the planning of the safeguards system.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2015. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, the number of inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey campaign to verify the design of the planned geological repository, called Onkalo. In 2015 a concise survey campaign was carried out at Onkalo resulting in an increased number of inspection days since 2013. The number of annual inspection days for nuclear material holders has remained at 20 days per international inspectorate.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2015 was focused on nuclear material control: in particular, information security issues were addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site.
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
Kokoelmat
- STUKin omat sarjajulkaisut [2281]